Computational co-Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) Assumption #
The co-CDH assumption in bilinear groups: given (g₁, g₂, g₁^a, g₂^b),
compute g₁^{ab}.
This is the standard hardness assumption underlying BLS signatures (Boneh-Lynn-Shacham 2004). It is equivalent to CDH in G₂ when the pairing exists, but stated in the Type III setting.
Main definitions #
CoCDH_Adversary— adversary that attempts to compute g₁^{ab}CoCDH_Game— the co-CDH gameCoCDH_Advantage— probability of solving co-CDHCoCDHSecure— co-CDH hardness assumption
Cross-Validation #
| Property | This file | Paper |
|---|---|---|
| Challenge | (g₁^a, g₂^b) | BLS04 §3 |
| Target | Compute g₁^{ab} | BLS04 §3 |
| Group | PairingGroup P (Type-III) | Bilinear group (G₁, G₂, G_T) |
Relationship to other assumptions:
- CDH in G₁ ⟹ co-CDH (co-CDH is weaker: adversary gets cross-group info)
- co-CDH is the standard BLS assumption; CDH in G₁ is sometimes used instead
References #
- Boneh, Lynn, Shacham. Short Signatures from the Weil Pairing. J. Cryptology, 2004, §3.
co-CDH Game #
@[reducible, inline]
co-CDH adversary: given (g₁^a, g₂^b), attempts to compute g₁^{ab}.
The adversary receives elements from both source groups and must produce an element of G₁.
Equations
Instances For
noncomputable def
CatCrypt.Crypto.Assumptions.CoCDH_Game
(P : PairingGroup)
(A : CoCDH_Adversary P)
:
co-CDH game: sample a, b ← Zₚ; adversary receives (g₁^a, g₂^b) and wins if it outputs g₁^{ab}.
Returns true if the adversary's output equals g₁^{ab}.
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Instances For
noncomputable def
CatCrypt.Crypto.Assumptions.CoCDH_Advantage
(P : PairingGroup)
(A : CoCDH_Adversary P)
:
co-CDH advantage: probability that the adversary computes g₁^{ab}.
Equations
Instances For
co-CDH hardness: all adversaries have bounded advantage.